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Abstract
Adversarial attacks on machine learning-based classifiers, along with defense
mechanisms, have been widely studied in the context of single-label classification
problems. In this paper, we shift the attention to multi-label classification, where the
availability of domain knowledge on the relationships among the considered classes
may offer a natural way to spot incoherent predictions, i.e., predictions associated
to adversarial examples lying outside of the training data distribution. We explore
this intuition in a framework in which first-order logic knowledge is converted
into constraints and injected into a semi-supervised learning problem. Within this
setting, the constrained classifier learns to fulfill the domain knowledge over the
marginal distribution, and can naturally reject samples with incoherent predictions.
Even though our method does not exploit any knowledge of attacks during training,
our experimental analysis surprisingly unveils that domain-knowledge constraints
can help detect adversarial examples effectively, especially if such constraints are
not known to the attacker. While we also show that an adaptive attack exploiting
knowledge of the constraints may still deceive our classifier, it remains an open
issue to understand how hard for an attacker would be to infer such constraints
in practical cases. For this reason, we believe that our approach may provide a
significant step towards designing robust multi-label classifiers.
1 Introduction
In the last few years, motivated by the large popularity of deep learning-based models, a growing
number of studies on the properties of adversarial attacks and of the corresponding defenses have been
produced by the scientific community [31, 6, 15, 9, 35, 38] (see [26] for a recent review on this topic).
Most of the existing works either propose methods for improving classifier robustness by modifying
the learning algorithm to explicitly account for the presence of adversarial data perturbations [16, 32,
36], or develop specific detection mechanisms for adversarial examples [7, 24, 34, 30, 23, 26]. Only
a few approaches focus on the semi-supervised learning setting [27, 33, 1, 10, 28, 42, 29, 2], although
it provides a natural setting for many real-world applications in which labeling data is costly while
unlabeled samples are readily available. More importantly, to the best of our knowledge, the problem
of multi-label classification, in which each example can belong to more classes, is only preliminary
discussed in the context of adversarial learning in [37], while using adversarial examples to improve
some types of multi-label classifiers is evaluated in [41, 4].
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In this paper, we focus on multi-label classification and, in particular, in the case in which domain
knowledge on the relationships among the considered classes is available. Such knowledge can be
naturally expressed by First-Order Logic (FOL) clauses, and, following the learning framework of [14,
12], it can be used to improve the classifier by enforcing FOL-based constraints on the unsupervised or
partially labeled portions of the training set. A well-known intuition in adversarial machine learning
suggests that a reliable model of the distribution of the data could be used to spot adversarial examples,
being them not sampled from such distribution, but it is not a straightforward procedure [18]. We
borrow such intuition and we intersect it with the idea that semi-supervised examples can help learn
decision boundaries that better follow the marginal data distribution, coherently with the available
knowledge [25, 12]. For those reasons, we study the role of those constraints that implement domain
knowledge as a mean to not only better shape the decision boundaries, but also as a measure to spot
examples that are likely to be generated in an adversarial setting.
What we propose differs from existing literature on semi-supervised learning in adversarial settings.
Miyato et al. [27, 28] and Park et el. [33] exploit adversarial training (virtual adversarial training
and adversarial dropout, respectively) to favor regularity around the supervised and unsupervised
training data, with the aim of improving the classifier performance. The work in [1] develops an
anomaly detector using adversarial training in the semi-supervised setting. Self-supervised learning
is exploited in [10, 29] to improve adversarial robustness, stability criteria are enforced on unlabeled
training data in [42], while the work in [2] specifically focuses on an unsupervised adversarial training
procedure, exploited in semi-supervised classification. Our model neither exploits adversarial training
nor any adversary-aware training criteria aimed at gaining intrinsic regularity. We focus on the role of
domain knowledge as an indirect mean to increase adversarial robustness and, afterwards, to detect
adversarial examples. Indeed, all the described methods could also be applied jointly with what we
propose. Moreover, our approach also differs from other adversarial-example detectors [7, 24, 34, 26]
as it has no additional training cost and negligible runtime cost.
This paper contributes in showing that domain knowledge is a powerful feature (1) to improve
robustness of multi-label classifiers and (2) to detect adversarial examples. To properly evaluate
the robustness of our approach, which remains one of the most challenging problems in adversarial
machine learning [8, 3, 6], we propose (3) a novel multi-label knowledge-driven attack that can
implement both black-box and white-box adaptive attacks. While we show that an adaptive attack
having access to the domain knowledge exploited by our classifier can bypass it, even though at the
cost of an increased perturbation size, it remains an open issue to understand how hard for an attacker
would be to infer such knowledge in practical cases. For this reason, we believe that our work can
provide a significant contribution towards both evaluating and designing robust multi-label classifiers.
2 Learning with Domain Knowledge
We consider a vector function f : X → Rc, where f = [f1, . . . , fc] and X ⊆ Rd. Each function fi
is responsible for implementing a specific task on the considered input domain X .2 In the context of
this paper, without loss of generality, we consider multi-label classification problems with c classes,
in which each input x ∈ X is associated to one or more classes. Function fi predicts the membership
degree of x to the i-th class. Moreover, when we restrict the output of fi to [0, 1], we can think of fi
as the fuzzy logic predicate that models the truth degree of belonging to class i. In order to simplify
the notation, we will frequently make no explicit distinctions between function names, predicate
names, class names or between input samples and predicate variables.
Whenever we focus on the predicate-oriented interpretation of each fi, First-Order Logic (FOL)
becomes the natural way of describing relationships among the considered classes, i.e., the most
effective type of domain knowledge that could be eventually available in a multi-label problem;
e.g., ∀x ∈ X , fv(x) ∧ fz(x) ⇒ fu(x), for some v, z, u, meaning that the intersection between
the v-th class and the z-th class is always included in the u-one. The framework of Learning from
Constraints [14, 17, 12] follows the idea of converting domain knowledge into constraints on the
learning problem and it studies, amongst a variety of other knowledge-oriented constraints (see, e.g.,
Table 2 in [14]), the process of handling FOL formulas so that they can be both injected into the
learning problem or used as a knowledge verification measure [17, 12]. Such knowledge is enforced
on those training examples for which either no information or only partial/incomplete labeling is
2This notion can be trivially extended to the case in which the task functions operate in different domains.
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available, thus casting the learning problem in the semi-supervised setting. As a result, the multi-label
classifier can improve its performance and make predictions on out-of-sample data that are more
coherent with the domain knowledge (see, e.g., Table 4 in [14]). In particular, FOL formulas that
represent the domain knowledge of the considered problem are converted into numerical constraints
using Triangular Norms (T-Norms, [22]), binary functions that generalize the conjunction operator
∧. Following the previous example, fv(x) ∧ fz(x)⇒ fu(x) is converted into a bilateral constraint
φ(f(x)) = 1 that, in the case of the product T-Norm, is 1 − fv(x)fz(x)(1 − fu(x)) = 1. The 1
on the right-hand side of the constraint is due to the fact that the numerical formula must hold true
(i.e, 1), while the left-hand side is in [0, 1]. We indicate with φˆ(f(x)) the loss function associated
to φ(f(x)). In the simplest case (as followed in this paper) such loss is φˆ(f(x)) = 1 − φ(f(x)),
where the minimum value of φˆ(f(x)) is zero. The quantifier ∀x ∈ X is translated by enforcing the
constraints on a discrete data sample Z ⊂ X . The loss function ϕ(f,Z) associated to knowledge K
is obtained by taking the sum (average) over the data in Z , and, since we usually have ` > 1 formulas
whose relative importance could be uneven, we get
ϕ(f,Z,K, µ) = 1|Z|
|Z|∑
j=1
(∑`
h=1
µhφˆh(f(xj))
)
∈ [0, γ] (1)
where µ is the vector that collects the scalar weights µh > 0 of the FOL formulas, and γ =
∑`
h=1 µh.
In this paper, f is implemented with a neural architecture with c output units and weights collected in
W . We distinguish between the use of Eq. (1) as a loss function in the training stage and its use as a
measure to evaluate the constraint fulfillment on out-of-sample data. In detail, the classifier is trained
on the training set L by minimizing
min
W
[
suploss(f(·,W ),L,S) + λ · ϕ(f(·,W ),L,K, µL)] (2)
where µL is the importance of the FOL formulas at training time, and λ > 0 modulates the weight of
the constraint loss with respect to the supervision loss suploss, being S the supervision information
attached to some of the data in L. The optimal λ is chosen by cross-validation, maximizing the
classifier performance. When the classifier is evaluated on a test sample x, the measure
ϕ(f(·,W ), {x},K, µT ) ∈ [0, γT ], (3)
with weights µT and γT =
∑`
h=1 µ
T
h , returns a score that indicates the fulfillment of the domain
knowledge on x (the lower the better). Note that µL and µT might not necessarily be equivalent,
even if certainly related. In particular, one may differently weigh the importance of some formulas
during training to better accommodate the gradient-descent procedure and avoid bad local minima.
It is important to notice that Eq. (2) enforces domain knowledge only on the training data L. There
are no guarantees that such knowledge will be fulfilled in the whole input space X . This suggests
that optimizing Eq. (2) yields a stronger fulfillment of knowledge K over the space regions where the
training points are distributed (low values of ϕ), while ϕ could return larger values when departing
from the distribution of the training data. The constraint enforcement is soft, so that the second term
in Eq. (2) is not necessarily zero at the end of the optimization.
3 Exploiting Domain Knowledge against Adversarial Attacks
The basic idea behind this paper is that the constraint loss of Eq. (1) is not only useful to enforce
domain knowledge into the learning problem, but also (i) to gain some robustness with respect to
adversarial attacks and (ii) as a tool to detect adversarial examples at no additional training cost. The
example in Fig. 1 illustrates the main principles followed in this work, in a multi-label classification
problem with 4 classes (cat, animal, motorbike, vehicle) for which the following domain knowledge
is available, together with labeled and unlabeled training data:
∀x, CAT(x)⇒ ANIMAL(x) , (4)
∀x, MOTORBIKE(x)⇒ VEHICLE(x) , (5)
∀x, VEHICLE(x)⇒ ¬ANIMAL(x) , (6)
∀x, CAT(x) ∨ ANIMAL(x) ∨MOTORBIKE(x) ∨ VEHICLE(x) . (7)
3
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Figure 1: Toy example using the domain knowledge of Eqs. (4-7) on 4 classes: cat (yellow), animal
(blue), motorbike (green), vehicle (red). Labeled/unlabeled training data are depicted with rounded
dots/gray triangles. (a,b) The decision regions for each class are shown: (a) open/loose decision
boundaries; (b) tight/closed decision boundaries. The white area is associated with no predictions.
Some adversarial examples (purple arrows/dots) are detected as they end up in regions that violate the
constraints. (c) The feasible/unfeasible regions that fulfill/violate the constraints for (a,b) are shown.
Such knowledge is converted into numerical constraints, as described in Sect. 2, and the loss function
ϕ is devised and enforced on the training data predictions during classifier training (Eq. 2). Fig. 1
shows two examples of the learned classifier. Considering point (i.), in both cases, the decision
boundaries are altered on the unlabeled data, enforcing the classifier to take a knowledge-coherent
decision over the unlabeled training points and to better cover the marginal distribution of the data.
This knowledge-driven regularity improves classifier robustness to adversarial attacks, as we will
discuss in Sect. 4. Going into further details to illustrate claim (ii.), in (a) we have the most likely case,
in which decision boundaries are not always perfectly tight to the data distribution, and they might
be not closed (ReLU networks typically return high-confidence predictions far from the training
data [19]). Three different attacks are shown (purple). In attack 1, an example of motorbike is
perturbed to become an element of the cat class, but Eq. (4) is not fulfilled anymore. In attack 2, an
example of animal is attacked to avoid being predicted as animal. However, it falls in a region where
no predictions are yielded, violating Eq. (7). Attack number 3 consists of an adversarial attack to
create a fake cat, that however, is also predicted as vehicle, thus violating Eq. (4)) and Eq. (6). In (b)
we have an ideal and extreme case, with very tight and closed decision boundaries. Some classes
are well separated, it is harder to generate adversarial examples by slightly perturbing the available
data, while it is easy to fall in regions for which Eq. (7) is not fulfilled. The pictures in (c) show
the unfeasible regions in which the constraint loss ϕ is significantly larger, thus offering a natural
criterion to spot adversarial examples that fall outside of the training data distribution.
Following these intuitions, and motivated by the approach of [21, 20], we define a rejection criterion
Ω as the Boolean expression
Ω(x, τ |f(·,W ),K, µT ) = ϕ(f(·,W ), {x},K, µT ) > τ (8)
where τ > 0 is estimated by cross-validation in order to avoid rejecting (or rejecting a small number
of3) the examples in the validation set V . Eq. (8) computes the constraint loss on the validation
data V , using the importance weights µT (that we will discuss in what follows), as in Eq. (3). The
rationale behind this idea is that those samples for which the constraint loss is larger than what it is
on the distribution of the considered data should be rejected. The training samples are the ones over
which domain knowledge was enforced during the training stage, while the validation set represents
data on which knowledge was not enforced, but that are sampled from the same distribution from
which the training set is sampled, making them good candidates for estimating τ .
Differently from ad-hoc detectors, that usually require to train generative models, this rejection
procedure comes at no additional training cost.4 The procedure is effective whenever the functions in
f are not too strongly paired with respect to K, and we formalize the notion of “pairing” as follows.
310% in our experiments.
4Generative models on the fulfillment of the single constraints could be considered too.
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Definition 1 We consider a classification problem whose training data are distributed accordingly
to the probability density p(x). Given K and µT , the functions in f are strongly paired whenever
ζ(H,L) = ‖ϕ(f(·,W ),H,K, µT )− ϕ(f(·,W ),L,K, µT )‖ ≈ 0, beingH a discrete set of samples
uniformly distributed around the support of p(x).
This notion indicates that if the constraint loss is fulfilled in similar ways over the training data
distribution and the space areas close to it, then there is no room for detecting those examples that
should be rejected. While it is not straightforward to conclude about the pairing of f before training
the classifier, the soft constraining scheme of Eq. (2) allows the classification functions to be paired
in a less strong manner that what they would be when using hard constraints.5 Note that a multi-label
system is usually equipped with activation functions that do not structurally enforce any dependencies
among the classes (e.g., differently from what happens with softmax), so it is naturally able to respond
without assigning any classes to the input (white areas in Fig. 1). This property has been recently
discussed as a mean for gaining robustness to adversarial examples [35, 5]. The formula in Eq. (7) is
what allows our model to spot examples that might fall in this “I don’t know” area. Dependencies
among classes are only introduced by the constraint loss ϕ in Eq. (2) on the training data.
The choice of µT is crucial in the definition of the reject function Ω. On the one hand, in some
problems we might have access to the certainty degree of each FOL formula, that could be used to set
µT , otherwise it seems natural to select an unbiased set of weights µT , µh = 1, ∀h. On the other
hand, several FOL formulas involve the implication operator⇒, that naturally implements if-then
rules (if class v then class z) or, equivalently, rules that are about hierarchies, since⇒ models an
inclusion (class v included in class z). However, whenever the premises are false, the whole formula
holds true. It might be easy to trivially fulfill the associated constrains by zeroing all the predicates in
the premises, eventually avoiding rejection. As rule of thumb, it is better to select µh’s that are larger
for those constraints that favor the activation of the involved predicates.
Attacking Multi-label Classifiers. Robustness against adversarial examples is typically evaluated
against black-box and white-box attacks [6, 26]. In the black-box setting, the attacker is assumed
to have only black-box query access to the target model, ignoring the presence of any defense
mechanisms such as the use of domain-knowledge constraints. However, a surrogate model can be
trained on data ideally sampled from the same distribution of that used to train the target model.
Within these assumptions, gradient-based attacks can be optimized against the surrogate model,
and then transferred/evaluated against the target one [31, 11]. In the white-box setting, instead, the
attacker is assumed to know everything about the target model, including the defense mechanism.
White-box attacks are thus expected to exploit knowledge of the defense mechanism to bypass it.
We propose here a novel multi-label knowledge-driven adversarial attack (MKA) that naturally
extends the formulation of single-label attacks and allows staging both black-box and white-box
(adaptive) attacks against our approach. Given x ∈ T , being T the test set, we consider the
sets of ground-truth positive and negative classes, Px and Nx, respectively. Let us define p =
arg mini[fi(x), i ∈ Px], and n = arg maxi[fi(x), i ∈ Nx], i.e., p (n) is the index of the positive
(negative) class with the smallest (largest) output score. These are essentially the indices of the
classes for which x is closer to the decision boundaries. Our attack optimizes the following objective,
x? = arg min
x′
[
max(lp(x
′),−κ)−min(ln(x′), κ) + αϕ(f, {x′},K, µT )
]
, s.t. ‖x−x′‖ <  (9)
where lj is the value of the logit of fj , ‖ · ‖ is an Lp-norm (L2 in our experiments), and in the
case of image data with pixel intensities in [0, 1] we also have x′ ∈ [0, 1]. The scalar κ ≥ 0 is
used to threshold the values of the logits, to avoid increasing/decreasing them in an unbounded way.
Optimizing the logit values is preferable to avoid sigmoid saturation (in our experiments, we set
κ = 2). While the definition of Eq. (9) is limited to a pair of classes, we dynamically update p and n
whenever logit lp (ln) goes beyond (above) the threshold −κ (κ), thus multiple classes are considered
by the attack, compatibly with the maximum number of iterations of the optimizer. This strategy
resulted to be more effective than jointly optimizing all the classes in Px and Nx. Moreover, the
classes involved in the attack can be a subset of the whole set. For white-box attacks, we use α > 0 to
enforce domain knowledge and avoid rejection. For black-box attacks, instead, we set α = 0. Eq. (9)
is minimized via projected gradient descent (1000 samples and 50 iterations in our experiments).
5See [39] for a discussion on hard constraints and graphical models in an adversarial context.
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Table 1: Datasets and details on the experimental setting. “Attr” stands for attributes; “Main” are
main attributes. See the main text for a description of the other column labels.
Dataset Attr Main #Examples %Labeled %Partial |L| |V| |T |
ANIMALS 33 7 8295 30% 90% 5808 1244 1243
CIFAR-100 120 100 60000 30% 0% 40000 10000 10000
PASCAL-Part 64 20 10102 30% 70% 7072 1515 1515
4 Experiments
We considered three image classification datasets, referred to as ANIMALS, CIFAR-100 and
PASCAL-Part respectively. The first one is a collection of real-world images of animals (mul-
tiple resolutions), taken from the ImageNet database,6 the second one is a popular benchmark
composed of RGB images (32× 32) belonging to different types of classes (vehicles, flowers, people,
etc.)5, while the last dataset is composed of images in which both objects (Man, Dog, Car, Train,
etc.) and object-parts (Head, Paw, Beak, etc.) are labeled.7 All datasets are used in a multi-label
classification setting, in which each image is paired with a fixed number of binary attributes. In
the case of ANIMALS there are 33 attributes, where the first 7 ones, also referred to as “main”
attributes/classes, are about the specific animal classes (albatross, cheetah, tiger, giraffe, zebra, os-
trich, penguin) while the other 25 attributes are about features of the animal classes (mammal, bird,
carnivore, fly, etc.). The CIFAR-100 dataset is composed of 120 attributes, out of which 100 are
fine-grained class labels (“main” attributes) and 20 are superclasses. In the PASCAL-Part dataset,
after merging classes as in [13], we have 64 classes, out of which 20 are objects (“main” attributes)
and the remaining 44 are object-parts. We have the use of domain knowledge that holds for all the
available examples. In the case of ANIMALS, it is a collection of FOL formulas that were defined
in the benchmark of P.H. Winston [40], and they involve relationships between animal classes and
animal properties, such as ∀x FLY(x) ∧ LAYEGGS(x)⇒ BIRD(x). In CIFAR-100, FOL formulas
are about the father-son relationships between classes, while in PASCAL-Part they either list all
the parts belonging to a certain object, i.e., MOTORBIKE(x)⇒WHEEL(x)∨ HEADLIGHT(x)∨
HANDLEBAR(x)∨ SADDLE(x) , or they list all the objects in which a part can be found, i.e.,
HANDLEBAR(x)⇒ BICYCLE(x)∨MOTORBIKE(x). In all cases we also introduced a disjunc-
tion or a mutual-exclusivity constraint among the main attributes, and another disjunction among
the other attributes. See Table 1 and the supplementary material for more details. Each dataset was
divided into training and test sets (the latter indicated with T ). The training set was further divided
into a learning set (L), used to train the classifiers, and a validation set (V), used to tune the model
parameters. We defined a semi-supervised learning scenario in which only a portion of the training set
is labeled, sometimes partially (i.e., only a fraction of the attributes of a labeled example is known),
as detailed in Table 1. We indicated with %Labeled the percentage of labeled training data, and with
%Partial the percentage of attributes that are unknown for each labeled example.8 We compared
two neural architectures, based on the popular backbone ResNet50 trained in ImageNet. In the first
network, referred to as TL, we transferred the ResNet50 model and trained the last layer from scratch
in order to predict the dataset-specific attributes (sigmoid activation). The second network, indicated
with FT, has the same structure of TL, but we also fine-tuned the last convolutional layer. Each
model is based on the product T-Norm, and it was trained for a number of epochs e that we selected as
follows: 1000 epochs in ANIMALS, 300 (TL) or 100 (FT) epochs in CIFAR-100, and 500 (TL) or
250 (FT) in PASCAL-Part, using minibatches of size 64. We used the Adam optimizer, with an initial
step size of 10−5, except for FT in CIFAR-100, for which we used 10−4 to speedup convergence.
We selected the model at the epoch that led to the largest F1 in V .
Standard Evaluation. To evaluate performance, we considered the (macro) F1 score and a metric
restricted to the main classes.9 For ANIMALS and CIFAR-100, the main classes are mutually
exclusive, so we measured the accuracy in predicting the winning main class (AccMain), while in
6ANIMALS http://www.image-net.org/, CIFAR-100 https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~kriz/cifar.html
7PASCAL-Part: https://www.cs.stanford.edu/~roozbeh/pascal-parts/pascal-parts.html
8When splitting the training data into L and V , we kept the same percentages of unknown attributes in both
the splits (of course, all the examples in V are labeled). Moreover, when generating partial labels, we ensured
that the percentages of discarded positive and negative attributes were the same.
9We compared the output values against 0.5 to obtain binary labels.
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Table 2: Multi-label classification results (mean± std) on test set T , for different models. The second
row-block is restricted to the main classes (Accuracy or F1). See the main text for further details.
Metric Dataset TL TL+C TL+CC FT FT+C
F1
ANIMALS 0.9826 ±0.0010 0.9863 ±0.0006 0.9811 ±0.0016 0.9858 ±0.0012 0.9917 ±0.0002
CIFAR 0.5202 ±0.0005 0.5509 ±0.0004 0.5310 ±0.0005 0.5929 ±0.0006 0.6399 ±0.0003
PASCAL 0.6946 ±0.0048 0.7000 ±0.0050 0.6939 ±0.0032 0.6915 ±0.0037 0.7097 ±0.0039
AccMain1
F1Main2
ANIMALS1 0.9882 ±0.0016 0.9922 ±0.0019 0.9925 ±0.0046 0.9850 ±0.0022 0.9909 ±0.0012
CIFAR1 0.5328 ±0.0030 0.5563 ±0.0007 0.5278 ±0.0010 0.6048 ±0.0019 0.6161 ±0.0012
PASCAL2 0.7376 ±0.0057 0.7595 ±0.0039 0.6950 ±0.0007 0.7039 ±0.0075 0.7505 ±0.0067
ANIMALS CIFAR-100 PASCAL-PART
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Figure 2: Black-box attacks. Classification quality of vanilla and knowledge-constrained models in
function of . Dotted plots include rejection (Rej) of inputs that are detected to be adversarial.
PASCAL-Part we kept the F1 score (F1Main) as multiple main classes can be predicted on the same
input. The results obtained after tuning λ ∈ {10−2, 10−1, 1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 102} are reported in Table 2,
averaged over 3 runs. The selected parameters are reported in the supplementary material. We
considered unconstrained (λ = 0) and constrained (+C) models and, for TL, we also considered a
strongly-constrained (+CC) model with inferior performance but higher coherence (greater λ) among
the predicted attributes (that might lead to a worse fitting of the supervisions).10 The introduction of
domain knowledge allows the constrained classifiers to outperform the unconstrained ones.
Adversarial Evaluation. To evaluate adversarial robustness, we used the MKA attack procedure
described in Sect. 2. We restricted the attack to work on the main classes associated to the most
important attributes of each problem, assuming that the decisions of the classifier on the other classes
are not exposed, but only internally used to evaluate knowledge-related constraints and eventually
reject samples that violate them. In ANIMALS and CIFAR-100 we assumed the attacker to have
access to the information on the mutual exclusivity of the main classes, so that p and n in Eq. (9) are
not required to change during the attack optimization. We also set κ =∞ to maximize confidence of
misclassifications at each given perturbation bound . All the following results are averaged after
having attacked twice the model obtained after each of the 3 training runs.
In the black-box setting, we assumed the attacker to be also aware of the network architecture of the
target classifier, and attacks were generated from a surrogate model trained on a different realization
of the training set. Fig. 2 shows the classification quality as a function of the data perturbation
bound , comparing models trained with and without constraints against those implementing the
detection/rejection mechanism described in Eq. (3). When using such mechanism, the rejected
examples are marked as correctly classified if they are adversarial ( > 0), otherwise ( = 0) they are
marked as points belonging to an unknown class, slightly worsening the performance. The +C/+CC
10In FT, due to the larger number of parameters, the constraint loss was already small in the +C case.
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Figure 3: White-box attacks in two selected cases.
models show larger accuracy/F1 than the unconstrained ones. Despite the lower results at  = 0,
models that are more strongly constrained (+CC) resulted to be harder to attack for increasing values
of . When the knowledge-based detector is activated, the improvements with respect to models
without rejection are significantly evident. No model is specifically designed to face adversarial
attacks and, of course, there are no attempts to reach state-of-the art results. However, the positive
impact of exploiting domain knowledge can be observed in all the considered models and datasets,
and for almost all the values of , confirming that such knowledge is not only useful to improve
classifier robustness, but also as a mean to detect adversarial examples at no additional training cost.
In general, FT models yield better results, due to the larger number of optimized parameters. In
ANIMALS the rejection dynamics are providing large improvements in both TL and FT, while the
impact of domain knowledge is mostly evident on the robustness of FT. In CIFAR-100, domain
knowledge only consists of basic hierarchical relations, with no intersections among child classes
or among father classes. By inspecting the classifier, we found that it is pretty frequent for the
fooling examples to be predicted with a strongly-activated father class and a (coherent) child class,
i.e., we have strongly-paired classes, accordingly to Def. 1. Differently, the domain knowledge in
the other datasets is more structured, yielding better detection quality on average, remarking the
importance of the level of detail of such knowledge to counter adversarial examples. In the case of
PASCAL-Part, the detection mechanism turned out to better behave in unconstrained classifiers, even
if it has a positive impact also on the constrained ones. This is due to the intrinsic difficulty of making
predictions on this dataset, especially when considering small object-parts. The false positives have a
negative effect in the training stage of the knowledge-constrained classifiers.
To provide a comprehensive, worst-case evaluation of the adversarial robustness of our approach,
we also considered a white-box adaptive attacker that knows everything about the target model and
exploits knowledge of the defense mechanism to bypass it. Of course, this attack always evades
detection if the perturbation size  is sufficiently large. We evaluated multiple values of α of Eq. (9),
selecting the one that yielded the lowest values of such objective function. In Fig. 3 we report the
outcome of two selected cases, showing that, even if the accuracy drop is obviously evident for both
datasets, in ANIMALS the constrained classifiers require larger perturbations than the unconstrained
ones to reduce the performance of the same quantity. Thus, fooling the detection mechanisms is
not always trivial as one might expect, even in this worst-case setting. We refer the reader to the
supplementary material for more details about these attacks and their optimization. Finally, let us
point out that the performance drop caused by the white-box attack is much larger than that observed
in the black-box case. However, since domain knowledge is not likely to be available to the attacker
in many practical settings, it remains an open challenge to develop stronger, practical black-box
attacks that are able to infer and exploit such knowledge to bypass our defense mechanism.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the role of domain knowledge in adversarial settings. Focusing on
multi-label classification, we injected knowledge expressed by First-Order Logic in the training
stage of the classifier, not only with the aim of improving its quality, but also as a mean to build a
detector of adversarial examples at no additional cost. We proposed a multi-label attack procedure and
showed that knowledge-constrained classifiers can improve their robustness against both black-box
and white-box attacks, depending on the nature of the available domain knowledge. We believe that
these findings will open the investigation of domain knowledge as a feature to further improve the
robustness of multi-label classifiers against adversarial attacks.
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Broader Impact
The outcomes of this work might help in fostering advancements in those studies that are about
adversarial machine learning. In a long-term perspective, this could lead to the development of more
robust machine learning-based multi-label classifiers. We believe that there are neither ethical aspects
nor evident future societal consequences that should be discussed in the context of this work.
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Supplementary Material
We report here some additional details on the attack optimization process and on the parameter
settings used in our experiments, along with the complete list of the domain-knowledge constraints
available for the considered datasets.
A Attack Optimization
Our attack optimizes Eq. (9) via projected gradient descent. Black-box attacks are non-adaptive,
and thus ignore the defense mechanism. For this reason, the constraint loss term ϕ in our attack
is ignored by setting its multiplier α = 0 and κ = ∞. For white-box attacks on ANIMALS and
PASCAL-PART, we set α = 0.1 and α = 1, respectively, while setting κ = 2. These values are
chosen to appropriately scale the values of the constraint loss term ϕ w.r.t. the logit difference (i.e.,
the first term in Eq. 9, lower bounded by −2κ). This is required to have the sample misclassified
while also fulfilling the domain-knowledge constraints. The process is better illustrated in Figs. 4 and
5, in which we respectively report the behavior of the black-box and white-box attack optimization
on a single image from the ANIMALS dataset, with  = 1. In particular, in each Figure we report the
source image, the (magnified) adversarial perturbation, and the resulting adversarial examples, along
with some plots describing the optimization process, i.e., how the attack loss of Eq. (9) is minimized
across iterations, and how the softmax-scaled outputs on the main classes and the logarithm of the
constraint loss ϕ change accordingly.
In both the black-box and white-box cases, the attack loss is progressively reduced during the
iterations of the optimization procedure. While the albatross prediction is progressively transformed
into ostrich, the constraint loss increases across iterations, exceeding the rejection threshold. Thus,
the adversarial example is correctly detected. Similarly, the white-box attack is able to initially flip
the prediction from albatross to ostrich, allowing the constraint loss to increase. However, after this
initial phase, the attack correctly reduces the constraint loss after its initial bump, bringing its value
below the rejection threshold. The system thus fails to detect the corresponding adversarial example.
Finally, it is also worth remarking that, in both cases, the final perturbations do not substantially
compromise the source image content, remaining essentially imperceptible to the human eye.
Figure 4: Black-box attack on the ANIMALS dataset. While the attack is able to flip the initial
prediction from albatross to ostrich, the attack is eventually detected as the constraint loss remains
above the rejection threshold (dashed black line).
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Figure 5: White-box attack on the ANIMALS dataset. The attack is able to flip the initial prediction
from albatross to ostrich, and then starts reducing the constraint loss which eventually falls below the
rejection threshold (dashed black line). The attack sample remains thus undetected.
B Parameter Settings
In Table 3, for each model, we report the optimal value of λ ∈ {10−2, 10−1, 1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 102} used
in our experiments, selected via a 3-fold cross-validation procedure. For completeness, in Table 4, we
also report the value of the constraint loss ϕ measured on the test set T . We used µL = µT , setting
each component µ·h to 1, with the exception of the weight of the mutual exclusivity constraint or the
disjunction of the main classes, which was set to 10 to enforce the classifier to take decisions on the
unsupervised portion of the training data.
Table 3: Parameter λ used in the experiments.
Model ANIMALS CIFAR-100 PASCAL-Part
FT 0 0 0
FT+C 10−2 3 10−1
FT+CC 1 10 1
TL 0 0 0
TL+C 10−2 3 10−1
Table 4: Values of the constraint loss ϕ measure on the test data T .
Model ANIMALS CIFAR-100 PASCAL-Part
FT 0.5833 ±0.0316 1.4440 ±0.0087 2.7286 ±0.0853
FT+C 0.2134 ±0.0160 1.0406 ±0.0020 1.7422 ±0.0516
FT+CC 0.2004 ±0.0097 0.7267 ±0.0020 0.7387 ±0.0151
TL 0.3751 ±0.0169 0.9603 ±0.0041 2.4478 ±0.0723
TL+C 0.0897 ±0.0113 0.4449 ±0.0068 0.8434 ±0.0471
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C Domain Knowledge
Each dataset is composed of a set of attributes (classes) that we formalize with logic predicates.
Such predicates participate in First-Order Logic (FOL) formulas that model the available domain
knowledge. The FOL formulas that define the domain knowledge of the ANIMALS, CIFAR-100
and PASCAL-Part data are reported in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 8, respectively, where each
predicate is indicated with capital letters. In each table (bottom part) we also report those rules
that are about activating at least one of the attributes of each level of the hierarchy. Following the
nomenclature used in the paper, the main attributes of the ANIMALS dataset are ALBATROSS, GIRAFFE,
CHEETAH, OSTRICH, PENGUIN, TIGER, ZEBRA, while the other attributes are MAMMAL, HAIR, MILK, FEATHERS,
BIRD, FLY, LAYEGGS, MEAT, CARNIVORE, POINTEDTEETH, CLAWS, FORWARDEYS, HOOFS, UNGULATE, CUD, EVENTOED,
TAWNY, BLACKSTRIPES, LONGLEGS, LONGNECK, DARKSPOTS, WHITE, BLACK, SWIM, BLACKWHITE, GOODFLIER. In the
case of the CIFAR-100 dataset, the main attributes are the ones associated with the predicates of
Table 6 that belong to the premises of the shortest FOL formulas (i.e., the formulas in the form A(x)⇒
B(x), where the main attribute is A). Formulas in PASCAL-Part are relationships between objects and
object-parts. The same part can belong to multiple objects, and in each objects several parts might be
visible. See Table 8 for the list of classes (main classes are in the premises of the second block of
formulas).
In ANIMALS and CIFAR-100, a mutual exclusion predicate is imposed on the main classes.
As a matter of fact, in these two datasets, each image is only about a single main class. The
mutual_excl(p_1, p_2, ..., p_n) predicate defined below, can be devised in different ways.
The first, straightforward approach consists in considering the disjunction of the true cases in the
truth table of the predicate:
mutual_excl(p1, p2, ..., pn) =
n∨
i=0
pi(x) ∧ n∧
j=0,j 6=i
¬pj(x)
 , i, j ∈M, (10)
where M is the set of the main classes, with cardinality n and pi(x) is the logic predicate correspond-
ing to the i-th output of the network fi(x). This formulation of the mutual_excl predicate is what
we used in the ANIMALS dataset. When there are seveal classes, as in CIFAR-100, this formulation
leads to optimization issues, since it turned out to be complicated to find a good balance between the
effect of this constraint and the supervision-fitting term. For this reason, the mutual exclusivity in
CIFAR-100 was defined as a disjunction of the main classes followed by a set of implications that are
used to implement the mutual exclusion of the predicates,
mutual_excl(p1, p2, ..., pn) =
{∨n
i=0 pi(x),
pi ⇒
∧n
j=0,j 6=i ¬pj(x), ∀i ∈M
(11)
that resulted easier to tune, since we have multiple soft constraints that could be eventually violated
to accommodate the optimization procedure.
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Table 5: Domain knowledge, ANIMALS dataset.
∀x HAIR(x) ∨MAMMAL(x)
∀x MILK(x)⇒MAMMAL(x)
∀x FEATHER(x)⇒ BIRD(x)
∀x FLY(x) ∧ LAYEGGS(x)⇒ BIRD(x)
∀x MAMMAL(x) ∧MEAT(x)⇒ CARNIVORE(x)
∀x MAMMAL(x) ∧ POINTEDTEETH(x) ∧ CLAWS(x) ∧ FORWARDEYES(x)⇒ CARNIVORE(x)
∀x MAMMAL(x) ∧ HOOFS(x)⇒ UNGULATE(x)
∀x MAMMAL(x) ∧ CUD(x)⇒ UNGULATE(x)
∀x MAMMAL(x) ∧ CUD(x)⇒ EVENTOED(x)
∀x CARNIVORE(x) ∧ TAWNY(x) ∧ DARKSPOTS(x)⇒ CHEETAH(x)
∀x CARNIVORE(x) ∧ TAWNY(x) ∧ BLACKSTRIPES(x)⇒ TIGER(x)
∀x UNGULATE(x) ∧ LONGLEGS(x) ∧ LONGNECK(x) ∧ TAWNY(x) ∧ DARKSPOTS(x)⇒ GIRAFFE(x)
∀x BLACKSTRIPES(x) ∧ UNGULATE(x) ∧WHITE(x)⇒ ZEBRA(x)
∀x BIRD(x) ∧ ¬FLY(x) ∧ LONGLEGS(x) ∧ LONGNECK(x) ∧ BLACK(x)⇒ OSTRICH(x)
∀x BIRD(x) ∧ ¬FLY(x) ∧ SWIM(x) ∧ BLACKWHITE(x)⇒ PENGUIN(x)
∀x BIRD(x) ∧ GOODFLIER(x)⇒ ALBATROSS(x)
∀x mutual_excl(ALBATROSS(x), GIRAFFE(x), CHEETAH(x), OSTRICH(x), PENGUIN(x), TIGER(x), ZEBRA(x))
∀x MAMMAL(x) ∨ HAIR(x) ∨MILK(x) ∨ FEATHERS(x) ∨ BIRD(x) ∨ FLY(x) ∨ LAYEGGS(x) ∨MEAT(x)
∨ CARNIVORE(x) ∨ POINTEDTEETH(x) ∨ CLAWS(x) ∨ FORWARDEYS(x) ∨ HOOFS(x) ∨ UNGULATE(x)
∨ CUD(x) ∨ EVENTOED(x) ∨ TAWNY(x) ∨ BLACKSTRIPES(x) ∨ LONGLEGS(x) ∨ LONGNECK(x)
∨ DARKSPOTS(x) ∨WHITE(x) ∨ BLACK(x) ∨ SWIM(x) ∨ BLACKWHITE(x) ∨ GOODFLIER(x)
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Table 6: Domain knowledge, CIFAR-100 dataset.
∀x AQUATIC MAMMALS(x)⇒ (BEAVER(x) ∨ DOLPHIN(x) ∨ OTTER(x) ∨ SEAL(x) ∨WHALE(x))
∀x BEAVER(x)⇒ AQUATIC MAMMALS(x)
∀x DOLPHIN(x)⇒ AQUATIC MAMMALS(x)
∀x OTTER(x)⇒ AQUATIC MAMMALS(x)
∀x SEAL(x)⇒ AQUATIC MAMMALS(x)
∀x WHALE(x)⇒ AQUATIC MAMMALS(x)
∀x FISH(x)⇒ (AQUARIUM FISH(x) ∨ FLATFISH(x) ∨ RAY(x) ∨ SHARK(x) ∨ TROUT(x))
∀x AQUARIUM_FISH(x)⇒ FISH(x)
∀x FLATFISH(x)⇒ FISH(x)
∀x RAY(x)⇒ FISH(x)
∀x SHARK(x)⇒ FISH (x)
∀x TROUT(x)⇒ FISH(x)
∀x FLOWERS(x)⇒ (ORCHID(x) ∨ POPPY(x) ∨ ROSE(x) ∨ SUNFLOWER(x) ∨ TULIP(x))
∀x ORCHID(x)⇒ FLOWERS(x)
∀x POPPY(x)⇒ FLOWERS(x)
∀x ROSE(x)⇒ FLOWERS(x)
∀x SUNFLOWER(x)⇒ FLOWERS(x)
∀x TULIP(x)⇒ FLOWERS(x)
∀x FOOD_CONTAINERS(x)⇒ (BOTTLE(x) ∨ BOWL(x) ∨ CAN(x) ∨ CUP(x) ∨ PLATE(x))
∀x BOTTLE(x)⇒ FOOD_CONTAINERS (x)
∀x BOWL(x)⇒ FOOD_CONTAINERS (x)
∀x CAN(x)⇒ FOOD_CONTAINERS (x)
∀x CUP(x)⇒ FOOD_CONTAINERS (x)
∀x PLATE(x)⇒ FOOD_CONTAINERS (x)
∀x FRUIT_AND_VEGETABLES(x)⇒ (APPLE(x) ∨MUSHROOM(x) ∨ ORANGE(x) ∨ PEAR(x)
∨ SWEET_PEPPER(x))
∀x APPLE(x)⇒ FRUIT_AND_VEGETABLES(x)
∀x MUSHROOM(x)⇒ FRUIT_AND_VEGETABLES(x)
∀x ORANGE(x)⇒ FRUIT_AND_VEGETABLES(x)
∀x PEAR(x)⇒ FRUIT_AND_VEGETABLES(x)
∀x SWEET_PEPPER(x)⇒ FRUIT_AND_VEGETABLES(x)
∀x HOUSEHOLD_ELECTRICAL_DEVICES(x)⇒ (CLOCK(x) ∨ KEYBOARD(x) ∨ LAMP(x)
∨ TELEPHONE(x) ∨ TELEVISION(x))
∀x CLOCK(x)⇒ HOUSEHOLD_ELECTRICAL_DEVICES(x)
∀x KEYBOARD(x)⇒ HOUSEHOLD_ELECTRICAL_DEVICES(x)
∀x LAMP(x)⇒ HOUSEHOLD_ELECTRICAL_DEVICES(x)
∀x TELEPHONE(x)⇒ HOUSEHOLD_ELECTRICAL_DEVICES(x)
∀x TELEVISION(x)⇒ HOUSEHOLD_ELECTRICAL_DEVICES(x)
∀x HOUSEHOLD_FURNITURE(x)⇒ (BED(x) ∨ CHAIR(x) ∨ COUCH(x) ∨ TABLE(x) ∨WARDROBE(x))
∀x BED(x)⇒ HOUSEHOLD_FURNITURE(x)
∀x CHAIR(x)⇒ HOUSEHOLD_FURNITURE(x)
∀x COUCH(x)⇒ HOUSEHOLD_FURNITURE(x)
∀x TABLE(x)⇒ HOUSEHOLD_FURNITURE(x)
∀x WARDROBE(x)⇒ HOUSEHOLD_FURNITURE(x)
∀x INSECTS(x)⇒ (BEE(x) ∨ BEETLE(x) ∨ BUTTERFLY(x) ∨ CATERPILLAR(x) ∨ COCKROACH(x))
∀x BEE(x)⇒ INSECTS(x)
∀x BEETLE(x)⇒ INSECTS(x)
∀x BUTTERFLY(x)⇒ INSECTS(x)
∀x CATERPILLAR(x)⇒ INSECTS(x)
∀x COCKROACH(x)⇒ INSECTS(x)
∀x LARGE_CARNIVORES(x)⇒ (BEAR(x) ∨ LEOPARD(x) ∨ LION(x) ∨ TIGER (x) ∨WOLF(x))
∀x BEAR(x)⇒ LARGE_CARNIVORES(x)
∀x LEOPARD(x)⇒ LARGE_CARNIVORES(x)
∀x LION(x)⇒ LARGE_CARNIVORES(x)
∀x TIGER(x)⇒ LARGE_CARNIVORES(x)
∀x WOLF(x)⇒ LARGE_CARNIVORES(x)
∀x LARGE_MAN-MADE_OUTDOOR_THINGS(x)⇒ (BRIDGE(x) ∨ CASTLE(x) ∨ HOUSE(x) ∨ ROAD(x)
∨ SKYSCRAPER(x))
∀x BRIDGE(x)⇒ LARGE_MAN-MADE_OUTDOOR_THINGS(x)
∀x CASTLE(x)⇒ LARGE_MAN-MADE_OUTDOOR_THINGS(x)
∀x HOUSE(x)⇒ LARGE_MAN-MADE_OUTDOOR_THINGS(x)
∀x ROAD(x)⇒ LARGE_MAN-MADE_OUTDOOR_THINGS(x)
∀x SKYSCRAPER(x)⇒ LARGE_MAN-MADE_OUTDOOR_THINGS(x)
∀x LARGE_NATURAL_OUTDOOR_SCENES(x)⇒ (CLOUD(x) ∨ FOREST(x) ∨MOUNTAIN(x)
∨ PLAIN(x) ∨ SEA(x))
∀x CLOUD(x)⇒ LARGE_NATURAL_OUTDOOR_SCENES(x)
∀x FOREST(x)⇒ LARGE_NATURAL_OUTDOOR_SCENES(x)
∀x MOUNTAIN(x)⇒ LARGE_NATURAL_OUTDOOR_SCENES(x)
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∀x PLAIN(x)⇒ LARGE_NATURAL_OUTDOOR_SCENES(x)
∀x SEA(x)⇒ LARGE_NATURAL_OUTDOOR_SCENES(x)
∀x LARGE_OMNIVORES_AND_HERBIVORES(x)⇒ (CAMEL(x) ∨ CATTLE(x) ∨ CHIMPANZEE(x)
∨ ELEPHANT(x) ∨ KANGAROO(x))
∀x CAMEL(x)⇒ LARGE_OMNIVORES_AND_HERBIVORES(x)
∀x CATTLE(x)⇒ LARGE_OMNIVORES_AND_HERBIVORES(x)
∀x CHIMPANZEE(x)⇒ LARGE_OMNIVORES_AND_HERBIVORES(x)
∀x ELEPHANT(x)⇒ LARGE_OMNIVORES_AND_HERBIVORES(x)
∀x KANGAROO(x)⇒ LARGE_OMNIVORES_AND_HERBIVORES(x)
∀x MEDIUM_MAMMALS(x)⇒ (FOX(x) ∨ PORCUPINE(x) ∨ POSSUM(x) ∨ RACCOON(x)
∨ SKUNK(x))
∀x FOX(x)⇒MEDIUM_MAMMALS(x)
∀x PORCUPINE(x)⇒MEDIUM_MAMMALS(x)
∀x POSSUM(x)⇒MEDIUM_MAMMALS(x)
∀x RACCOON(x)⇒MEDIUM_MAMMALS(x)
∀x SKUNK(x)⇒MEDIUM_MAMMALS(x)
∀x NON-INSECT_INVERTEBRATES(x)⇒ (CRAB(x) ∨ LOBSTER(x) ∨ SNAIL(x) ∨ SPIDER(x)
∨WORM(x))
∀x CRAB(x)⇒ NON-INSECT_INVERTEBRATES(x)
∀x LOBSTER(x)⇒ NON-INSECT_INVERTEBRATES(x)
∀x SNAIL(x)⇒ NON-INSECT_INVERTEBRATES(x)
∀x SPIDER(x)⇒ NON-INSECT_INVERTEBRATES(x)
∀x WORM(x)⇒ NON-INSECT_INVERTEBRATES(x)
∀x PEOPLE(x)⇒ (BABY(x) ∨MAN(x) ∨WOMAN(x) ∨ BOY(x) ∨ GIRL(x))
∀x BABY(x)⇒ PEOPLE(x)
∀x BOY(x)⇒ PEOPLE(x)
∀x GIRL(x)⇒ PEOPLE(x)
∀x MAN(x)⇒ PEOPLE(x)
∀x WOMAN(x)⇒ PEOPLE(x)
∀x REPTILES(x)⇒ (CROCODILE(x) ∨ DINOSAUR(x) ∨ LIZARD(x) ∨ SNAKE(x) ∨ TURTLE(x))
∀x CROCODILE(x)⇒ REPTILES(x)
∀x DINOSAUR(x)⇒ REPTILES(x)
∀x LIZARD(x)⇒ REPTILES(x)
∀x SNAKE(x)⇒ REPTILES(x)
∀x TURTLE(x)⇒ REPTILES(x)
∀x SMALL_MAMMALS(x)⇒ (HAMSTER(x) ∨MOUSE(x) ∨ RABBIT(x) ∨ SHREW(x) ∨ SQUIRREL(x))
∀x HAMSTER(x)⇒ SMALL_MAMMALS(x)
∀x MOUSE(x)⇒ SMALL_MAMMALS(x)
∀x RABBIT(x)⇒ SMALL_MAMMALS(x)
∀x SHREW(x)⇒ SMALL_MAMMALS(x)
∀x SQUIRREL(x)⇒ SMALL_MAMMALS(x)
∀x TREES(x)⇒ (MAPLE_TREE(x) ∨ OAK_TREE(x) ∨ PALM_TREE(x) ∨ PINE_TREE(x)
∨WILLOW_TREE(x))
∀x MAPLE_TREE(x)⇒ TREES(x)
∀x OAK_TREE(x)⇒ TREES(x)
∀x PALM_TREE(x)⇒ TREES(x)
∀x PINE_TREE(x)⇒ TREES(x)
∀x WILLOW_TREE(x)⇒ TREE(x)
∀x VEHICLES1(x)⇒ (BIKE(x) ∨ BUS(x) ∨MOTORBIKE(x) ∨ PICKUP_TRUCK(x) ∨ TRAIN(x))
∀x BIKE(x)⇒ VEHICLES1(x)
∀x BUS(x)⇒ VEHICLES1(x)
∀x MOTORBIKE(x)⇒ VEHICLES1(x)
∀x PICKUP(x)⇒ VEHICLES1(x)
∀x TRAIN(x)⇒ VEHICLES1(x)
∀x VEHICLES2(x)⇒ (LAWN MOWER(x) ∨ ROCKET(x) ∨ STREETCAR(x) ∨ TANK(x) ∨ TRACTOR(x))
∀x LAWN MOWER(x)⇒ VEHICLES2(x)
∀x ROCKET(x)⇒ VEHICLES2(x)
∀x STREETCAR(x)⇒ VEHICLES2(x)
∀x TANK(x)⇒ VEHICLES2(x)
∀x TRACTOR(x)⇒ VEHICLES2(x)
∀x mutual_excl( APPLE(x), AQUARIUM FISH(x), BABY(x), BEAR(x), BEAVER (x), BED(x), BEE(x),
BEETLE(x), BICYCLE(x), BOTTLE(x), BOWL (x), BOY(x), BRIDGE(x), BUS(x),
BUTTERFLY(x), CAMEL(x), CAN(x), CASTLE(x), CATERPILLAR(x) , CATTLE(x), CHAIR(x)
CHIMPANZEE(x), CLOCK(x), CLOUD(x) , COCKROACH(x), COUCH(x), CRAB(x),
CROCODILE(x) , CUP(x), DINOSAUR(x), DOLPHIN(x), ELEPHANT(x), FLATFISH(x),
FOREST(x), FOX(x), GIRL(x), HAMSTER(x), HOUSE(x), KANGAROO(x), KEYBOARD(x),
LAMP(x) , LAWN_MOWER(x), LEOPARD(x), LION(x), LIZARD(x), LOBSTER(x), MAN(x),
MAPLE_TREE(x) , MOTORCYCLE(x), MOUNTAIN(x), MOUSE(x), MUSHROOM(x),
OAK_TREE(x), ORANGE(x), ORCHID(x), OTTER(x), PALM_TREE(x), PEAR(x),
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PICKUP_TRUCK(x) , PINE_TREE(x), PLAIN(x), PLATE(x), POPPY(x), PORCUPINE(x),
POSSUM(x), RABBIT(x), RACCOON(x), RAY(x), ROAD(x), ROCKET(x), ROSE(x), SEA(x),
SEAL(x), SHARK(x), SHREW(x), SKUNK(x) ∨ SKYSCRAPER(x), SNAIL(x), SNAKE(x),
SPIDER(x), SQUIRREL(x), STREETCAR(x), SUNFLOWER(x), SWEET_PEPPER(x), TABLE(x),
TANK(x), TELEPHONE(x), TELEVISION(x), TIGER(x), TRACTOR(x), TRAIN(x), TROUT(x),
TULIP(x), TURTLE(x), WARDROBE(x), WHALE(x), WILLOW_TREE(x), WOLF(x)
WOMAN(x), WORM(x) )
∀x mutual_excl( AQUATIC MAMMALS(x), FISH(x), FLOWERS(x), FOOD CONTAINERS(x),
FRUIT AND VEGETABLES(x), HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICAL (x), HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE(x),
INSECTS(x) , LARGE CARNIVORES(x), MAN-MADE OUTDOOR (x),
NATURAL OUTDOOR SCENES(x), OMNIVORES AND HERBIVORES(x), MEDIUM MAMMALS(x),
INVERTEBRATES(x) , PEOPLE(x) , REPTILES(x) , SMALL MAMMALS(x), TREES(x),
VEHICLES1(x), VEHICLES2(x) )
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Table 8: Domain knowledge, PASCAL-Part dataset.
∀x SCREEN(x)⇒ (TVMONITOR)
∀x COACH(x)⇒ (TRAIN(x))
∀x TORSO(x)⇒ (PERSON(x)∨ HORSE(x)∨ COW(x)∨ DOG(x)∨ BIRD(x)∨ CAT(x)∨ SHEEP(x))
∀x LEG(x)⇒ (PERSON(x)∨ HORSE(x)∨ COW(x)∨ DOG(x)∨ BIRD(x)∨ CAT(x)∨ SHEEP(x))
∀x HEAD(x)⇒ (PERSON(x)∨ HORSE(x)∨ COW(x)∨ DOG(x)∨ BIRD(x)∨ CAT(x)∨ SHEEP(x))
∀x EAR(x)⇒ (PERSON(x)∨ HORSE(x)∨ COW(x)∨ DOG(x)∨ CAT(x)∨ SHEEP(x))
∀x EYE(x)⇒ (PERSON(x)∨ COW(x)∨ DOG(x)∨ BIRD(x)∨ CAT(x)∨ HORSE(x)∨ SHEEP(x))
∀x EBROW(x)⇒ (PERSON(x))
∀x MOUTH(x)⇒ (PERSON(x))
∀x HAIR(x)⇒ (PERSON(x))
∀x NOSE(x)⇒ (PERSON(x)∨ DOG(x)∨ CAT(x))
∀x NECK(x)⇒ (PERSON(x)∨ HORSE(x)∨ COW(x)∨ DOG(x)∨ BIRD(x)∨ CAT(x)∨ SHEEP(x))
∀x ARM(x)⇒ (PERSON(x))
∀x MUZZLE(x)⇒ (HORSE(x)∨ COW(x)∨ DOG(x)∨ SHEEP(x))
∀x HOOF(x)⇒ (HORSE(x))
∀x TAIL(x)⇒ (HORSE(x)∨ COW(x)∨ DOG(x)∨ BIRD(x)∨ SHEEP(x)∨ CAT(x)∨ AEROPLANE(x))
∀x BOTTLE BODY(x)⇒ (BOTTLE(x))
∀x PAW(x)⇒ (DOG(x)∨ CAT(x))
∀x AEROPLANE BODY(x)⇒ (AEROPLANE(x))
∀x WING(x)⇒ (AEROPLANE(x)∨ BIRD(x))
∀x WHEEL(x)⇒ (AEROPLANE(x)∨ CAR(x)∨ BICYCLE(x)∨ BUS(x)∨MOTORBIKE(x))
∀x STERN(x)⇒ (AEROPLANE(x))
∀x CAP(x)⇒ (BOTTLE(x))
∀x HAND(x)⇒ (PERSON(x))
∀x FRONTSIDE(x)⇒ (CAR(x)∨ BUS(x)∨ TRAIN(x))
∀x RIGHTSIDE(x)⇒ (CAR(x)∨ BUS(x)∨ TRAIN(x))
∀x ROOFSIDE(x)⇒ (CAR(x)∨ BUS(x)∨ TRAIN(x))
∀x BACKSIDE(x)⇒ (CAR(x)∨ BUS(x)∨ TRAIN(x))
∀x LEFTSIDE(x)⇒ (CAR(x)∨ TRAIN(x)∨ BUS(x))
∀x DOOR(x)⇒ (CAR(x)∨ BUS(x))
∀x MIRROR(x)⇒ (CAR(x)∨ BUS(x))
∀x HEADLIGHT(x)⇒ (CAR(x)∨ BUS(x)∨ TRAIN(x)∨MOTORBIKE(x)∨ BICYCLE(x))
∀x MOTORBIKE(x)⇒ (WHEEL(x)∨ HEADLIGHT(x)∨ HANDLEBAR(x)∨ SADDLE(x))
∀x WINDOW(x)⇒ (CAR(x)∨ BUS(x))
∀x PLATE(x)⇒ (CAR(x)∨ BUS(x))
∀x ENGINE(x)⇒ (AEROPLANE(x))
∀x FOOT(x)⇒ (PERSON(x)∨ BIRD(x))
∀x CHAINWHEEL(x)⇒ (BICYCLE(x))
∀x SADDLE(x)⇒ (BICYCLE(x)∨MOTORBIKE(x))
∀x HANDLEBAR(x)⇒ (BICYCLE(x)∨MOTORBIKE(x))
∀x TRAIN HEAD(x)⇒ (TRAIN(x))
∀x BEAK(x)⇒ (BIRD(x))
∀x POT(x)⇒ (POTTEDPLANT(x))
∀x PLANT(x)⇒ (POTTEDPLANT(x))
∀x HORN(x)⇒ (COW(x)∨ SHEEP(x))
∀x TVMONITOR(x)⇒ (SCREEN(x))
∀x TRAIN(x)⇒ (COACH(x)∨ LEFTSIDE(x)∨ TRAIN HEAD(x)∨ HEADLIGHT(x)∨ FRONTSIDE(x)
∨RIGHTSIDE(x)∨ BACKSIDE(x)∨ ROOFSIDE(x))
∀x PERSON(x)⇒ (TORSO(x)∨ LEG(x)∨ HEAD(x)∨ EAR(x)∨ EYE(x)∨ EBROW(x)∨MOUTH(x)∨ HAIR(x)
∨NOSE(x)∨ NECK(x)∨ ARM(x)∨ HAND(x)∨ FOOT(x))
∀x HORSE(x)⇒ (HEAD(x)∨ EAR(x)∨MUZZLE(x)∨ TORSO(x)∨ NECK(x)∨ LEG(x)∨ HOOF(x)∨ TAIL(x)∨ EYE(x))
∀x COW(x)⇒ (HEAD(x)∨ EAR(x)∨ EYE(x)∨MUZZLE(x)∨ TORSO(x)∨ NECK(x)∨ LEG(x)∨ TAIL(x)∨ HORN(x))
∀x BOTTLE(x)⇒ (BOTTLE BODY(x)∨ CAP(x))
∀x DOG(x)⇒ (HEAD(x)∨ EAR(x)∨ TORSO(x)∨ NECK(x)∨ LEG(x)∨ PAW(x)∨ EYE(x)∨MUZZLE(x)
∨ NOSE(x)∨ TAIL(x))
∀x AEROPLANE(x)⇒ (AEROPLANE BODY(x)∨WING(x)∨WHEEL(x)∨ STERN(x)∨ ENGINE(x)∨ TAIL(x))
∀x CAR(x)⇒ (FRONTSIDE(x)∨ RIGHTSIDE(x)∨ DOOR(x)∨MIRROR(x)∨ HEADLIGHT(x)∨WHEEL(x)
∨ WINDOW(x)∨ PLATE(x)∨ ROOFSIDE(x)∨ BACKSIDE(x)∨ LEFTSIDE(x))
∀x BUS(x)⇒ (PLATE(x)∨ FRONTSIDE(x)∨ RIGHTSIDE(x)∨ DOOR(x)∨MIRROR(x)∨ HEADLIGHT(x)
∨WINDOW(x)∨WHEEL(x)∨ LEFTSIDE(x)∨ BACKSIDE(x)∨ ROOFSIDE(x))
∀x BICYCLE(x)⇒ (WHEEL(x)∨ CHAINWHEEL(x)∨ SADDLE(x)∨ HANDLEBAR(x)∨ HEADLIGHT(x))
∀x BIRD(x)⇒ (HEAD(x)∨ EYE(x)∨ BEAK(x)∨ TORSO(x)∨ NECK(x)∨ LEG(x)∨ FOOT(x)∨ TAIL(x)∨WING(x))
∀x CAT(x)⇒ (HEAD(x)∨ EAR(x)∨ EYE(x)∨ NOSE(x)∨ TORSO(x)∨ NECK(x)∨ LEG(x)∨ PAW(x)∨ TAIL(x))
∀x MOTORBIKE(x)⇒ (WHEEL(x)∨ HEADLIGHT(x)∨ HANDLEBAR(x)∨ SADDLE(x))
∀x SHEEP(x)⇒ (HEAD(x)∨ EAR(x)∨ EYE(x)∨MUZZLE(x)∨ TORSO(x)∨ NECK(x)∨ LEG(x)∨ TAIL(x)∨ HORN(x))
∀x POTTEDPLANT(x)⇒ (POT(x)∨ PLANT(x))
∀x TVMONITOR(x)∨ TRAIN(x)∨ PERSON(x)∨ BOAT(x)∨ HORSE(x)∨ COW(x)∨ BOTTLE(x)∨ DOG(x)
∨ AEROPLANE(x)∨ CAR(x)∨ BUS(x)∨ BICYCLE(x)∨ TABLE(x)∨ CHAIR(x)∨ BIRD(x)∨ CAT(x)
∨MOTORBIKE(x)∨ SHEEP(x)∨ SOFA(x)∨ POTTEDPLANT(x)
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